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‘But in Asia we, too, are Europeans’:1 
Russia’s multifaceted engagement with the standard of civilisation 
 
Abstract 
The standard of civilisation served Western states to hierarchically organize international 
politics and reproduce Western pre-eminence. Russia, depending on the historical period, has 
been interpreted as either an ardent follower or a major challenger to Western projects but it 
has been markedly absent from debates regarding the standard. This article proposes to 
engage Russia in the standard of civilisation discussion with reference to the standard’s two 
most considered expositions: the colonial-era ‘original’ and what the literature interprets as 
the standard’s contemporary revival. In order to do so, I trace Russia’s nineteenth century 
colonial practices and analyse Russia’s selected policies towards post-Soviet states in the 
post-Cold War period. On the basis of these explorations, I argue that Russia’s application of 
the standard of civilisation goes beyond the mere reproduction of hierarchical arrangements 
between an imagined centre and peripheries. The practices of the standard of civilisation have 
been employed to improve Russia’s desired, and imagined, status in international politics – 
that of a great power equal to the West. From that it follows that the concept of the standard 
of civilisation should be recognised as ordering relations not only of the strong and the weak 
but also of those in position of power in international politics. 
 
Introduction 
The idea of the standard of civilisation refers to a fundamental aspect of international 
politics – inequality. Discussing the standard of civilisation is therefore one way of studying 
the nature of relations between the ‘centre’ and ‘peripheries’, a dichotomy facilitated and 
reproduced by the employment of the standard in international politics. Contemporary 
scholarship engages with the standard of civilisation with special reference to two historical 
epochs: the period of thriving colonial empires
2
 and what is interpreted as contemporary 
revival of practices resembling the standard, often termed the ‘new standard of civilisation’.3  
The West has always been the primary reference point in these debates. Russia has 
occupied a marginal place, either subsumed under Europe, as Europe’s exponent in Asia, or 
regarded as unable to fulfil the Western criteria of internal governance and therefore 
incapable of acting as a standard-setter. Even the most recent explorations of non-Western 
states engagement with the standard of civilisation overlook Russia. The discussion about the 
 2 
standard of civilisation is, however, incomplete without sufficient attention paid to Russia and 
practices it employed towards the conquered lands. Russia makes for an especially interesting 
case due to its troublesome and waving relationship with Europe. The Western-centric 
orientation of the debate unfolding to date forecloses questions as to how the standard of 
civilisation structures relations not solely between the strong and the weak but also between 
those in positions of power in international politics. Engagement with Russia offers, on the 
one hand, insights into the role and workings of the standard of civilisation. On the other 
hand, it allows discussing the place of Western ideas in Russia’s politics and considering the 
extent to which Russia is an absorber and emulator of Western concepts or a state challenging 
and modifying them. 
Aiming to contribute to the existing debate on the standard of civilisation, the article 
explores two periods in which Russian policies were, if only implicitly, informed by the idea 
of the standard of civilisation: the tsarist Russia’s conquest unfolding in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, and the Russian Federation’s post-1991 engagement with the post-Soviet 
space. Historical analogies are necessarily inaccurate and controversial but my objective here 
is not to engage in reasoning by analogy. I reflect on processes which, rather than recurring, 
may be continually at work. There are countless elements differentiating the tsarist period 
from the Russian present but contemplating these two epochs in conjuncture allows taking a 
broader view of tensions and paradoxes characterizing Russia’s relations with the West and 
Russia’s engagement with its most immediate neighbours. An additional justification for 
treating these two time periods in conjunction is provided by the contemporary Russian 
discourse, which makes frequent reference to the epochs of Catherine II and Alexander II.
4
 
The article unfolds in four steps. First, I discuss the conspicuous absence of Russia from 
the debate on the standard of civilisation. Two subsequent parts analyse and assess standard-
informed policies towards Russia’s neighbours in nineteenth and twenty-first centuries. The 
final part proposes that the standard of civilisation should be considered not solely as an 
instrument of regional hierarchy building but also as essential in structuring relations between 
Russia and great powers. 
 
The evolving idea of the standard of civilisation 
Considerable scholarship has been dedicated to the studying of the intimate relationship 
between the colonial expansion of European states and the idea of the standard of civilisation. 
Literature suggested that the standard of civilisation originated in Europe in the nineteenth 
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century and was used to legitimise the domination of powerful states. Predicated on Western 
states considering themselves to be the representatives of a genuine – meaning ‘better’ – 
civilisation, it allowed for and ‘normalized’ the hierarchisation of international politics, 
perpetuating the division between the ‘centre’ and ‘peripheries’. The idea of the standard of 
civilisation justified the expansion of Western social, political, legal and cultural norms and 
practices beyond Europe.
5
 The widely-held belief in the concept of civilisation and in the 
inequality of races led to the establishing of an hierarchy in which the non-European world 
remained subordinated to the centre. This paved the way for the ‘elaborate debates as to the 
principles, criteria, and “standards of civilization” by which non-European states might be 
accepted as sovereign members of the “society of states” or the “family of nations”’. 6 
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the standard of civilisation was 
attached to a changing list of requirements the ‘non-civilised’ polities were expected to fulfil. 
Though it achieved the status of a legal doctrine, parts of it remained implicit, unspoken. 
There was never a complete agreement regarding the set of norms the standard comprised. 
Powerful states tended to pick and choose the criteria defining a ‘civilized’ state.7 
Initially and in the most direct sense, the standard of civilisation was a prescription on 
how to treat foreign nationals. It gradually became part of international customary law. With 
time, however, the idea broadened to encompass issues beyond the basic rights of European 
nationals. It served to bar certain states from participating in interstate relations, to impose 
unequal treaties, specific policies, institutions and values on non-Western states.
8
 As a result 
certain political entities were not granted formal equal standing in international affairs.
9
  
The standard of civilisation came to encompass tacit and explicit rules that enabled a 
distinction to be made between those states that belonged to a particular, allegedly more 
advanced grouping, and those that did not. The idea, thus, was premised on and perpetuated 
the division between the advanced, privileged rule makers and those who followed—willingly 
or through coercion. One of its core functions was to maintain centre-periphery distinction 
through practices officially aimed at nursing those in the peripheries to become ‘like us’. 
Edward Keene interpreted the standard as a justification for the creation of two distinct 
orders, each ruled by starkly contrasting laws. The European order was premised on the 
principle of participants’ equality, while the second – inferior and subordinate – was 
deliberately sustained in colonial peripheries by the leading European states.
10
 Antony Anghie 
noted that it was precisely the inscription of the standard of civilisation into international law 
that allowed this unequal relation between the two orders to be maintained.
11
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Literature on the standard of civilisation focused on relations between those in power and 
their subordinates, paying surprisingly little attention to the influence of the standard on 
relations among the powerful states. The analysis of Japan’s policy towards China in the late 
19
th
-century, undertaken by Shogo Suzuki, and Taesuh Cha’s take on the US and Europe are  
two notable exceptions. Suzuki argues that Japanese elites considered the successful conquest 
and subordination of China as necessary to achieve the status of a ‘civilised’ state. Japan 
made a considerable and conscious effort to reinvent the Japanese state into a ‘civilised’ one 
modelled on the West by means of engaging in imperialist politics towards China.
12
 Taesuh 
Cha used the concept of the standard of civilization to account for the formation of American 
exceptionalism, in particular to explain how the US establishment of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century came to believe in America’s superiority over Europe.13 
The standard of civilisation seemingly faded away following the creation of the United 
Nations, an organisation meant to embody the principle of sovereign equality between states. 
As a result of the decolonisation process, the political map of the world became populated 
with dozens of states formally recognised as equal. But, in the aftermath of the Cold War and 
throughout the era of Western pre-eminence, thinking in terms of the standard of civilisation 
enjoyed a revival. The idea became re-interpreted as a way for the West to reorganize 
relations with non-European and less developed states. Requirements as far-reaching and 
comprehensive as the political and economic organisation of the state came to be constructed 
as the new or revived standard of civilisation.
14
  
The literature argues that, similarly to its nineteenth century predecessor, the new 
standard of civilisation is aimed at the re-creation and reproduction of hierarchical 
arrangements between states. It is said to be exposed in the economic sphere, mainly in trade 
and financial regulations.
15
 The global market is claimed to serve as the ‘civilizer of peoples 
and societies’ both in their domestic and external relations.16 Market relations are considered 
key to the establishment and implementation of the ‘global standards of market civilization’.17 
Beyond economy, the new standard is said to be means of creating liberal modernity.
18
 
Disguised under developmental and humanitarian language, the new standard of civilisation 
agenda encompasses democracy and human rights promotion, and liberal interventionism.
19
 
Brett Bowden interprets the new standard of civilisation as a major tool in shaping 
international politics, one geared towards achieving a globalized cosmopolitan world order.
20
 
This debate groups a broad range of phenomena and processes under the banner of the 
new standard of civilisation. There is no scope in this article to engage with normative 
 5 
contradictions permeating the idea of the new standard of civilisation. Important for our 
present purpose is that, despite the diversity of issues assembled under the notion of the new 
standard, the common foundation is the reproduction of hierarchical arrangements so aptly 
exposed by the idea.
21
 
 
(ii) Russia’s absence in the debates about the standard  
Russia occupies a marginal place in the standard of civilisation debate, regardless of 
whether it concerns the 19
th
 century or the contemporary version. Neither the classical 
approach, represented by the early English School, nor the critical one, visible in the writings 
of Edward Keene and Antony Anghie, paid attention to Russia’s practices in what it regarded 
as its peripheries. When engaging with the standard, the classical English School, not overly 
preoccupied with the area east of the Rhine, assumed that the type of state Russia copied from 
Europe in the early 18
th
 century and the overall westernisation of the country, enabled it to 
join European international society and to play a part in its expansion towards Asia.
22
 Russia 
was interpreted as an outpost of European international society in the 19
th
 and the beginning 
of the 20
th
 centuries. Indeed, Bull and Watson’s renowned volume The Expansion of 
International Society, discusses the role of the competing powers of Russia and Britain in 
Asia in conjunction: 
On the whole, the British and the Russians do not seem to have treated Asian states 
with any more impatience and violence than that experienced by smaller European 
countries in time of conflict with more powerful neighbours. For example, the reason, 
or excuse, given for the partition of Poland was much the same as that given for the 
annexation of the Punjab and of Kokand – the ‘need’ to control anarchic conditions in 
an adjacent state.’23 
Hedley Bull reiterated this view: ‘Like the maritime expansion of the Western European 
states, the expansion of Russia by land proceeded by the subjugation of indigenous 
communities and immigration and settlement by metropolitan peoples’.24 
This standpoint, however, needed to be problematised with the employment of a more 
nuanced historical perspective and the acceptance of the fact that there existed multiple 
narratives on Russia’s relationship with the West. In the 18th century Russia was seen as 
joining the ranks of European great powers, particularly with the triumph of Alexander I over 
Napoleonic France.
25
 In the course of the 19
th
 century, however, the tsarist empire began to 
fall behind its European counterparts and doubts were raised regarding its ‘place’ in European 
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politics. Russia’s rulers felt vulnerable in their relations with the West, and the defeat in the 
Crimean War exacerbated the feeling of inferiority.
26
 Neumann ascribed Russia’s difficulties 
in remaining an equal partner for European states to its inability to meet the nineteenth 
century standards of internal governance. Such inability made it difficult for Russia to be 
recognised as a great power.
27
  
Similar set of narratives resurfaced in the aftermath of the Soviet Union break-up. 
Scholars initially interpreted the fall of the USSR as the end to the ‘dissociation of [Russia] 
from the West’.28 Russia was interpreted in terms of striving to ‘adapt’ to global Western-led 
institutions,
29
 in the ‘quest’ for international society30  or undergoing a ‘slow and uneven 
process of adjustment towards the acceptance of common rules’.31 The main question for 
scholars in the post-Cold War period has been to what extent Russia can be integrated into the 
West, suggesting thereby Russia’s adaptive and passive role.32  
These analyses did not account for contemporary Russia’s growing dissociation from 
liberal models epitomised and promoted by democratic states. The disenchantment with the 
West, captured aptly by Dmitri Trenin,
33
 resulted in the incremental change of Moscow’s 
foreign policy and led to the questioning of Western values. Along with increasing 
assertiveness and outright rejection of Western norms, Russia started to be perceived as 
lagging behind the West. Just as in the 19
th
 century, Russia failed to meet the Western criteria 
of internal governance. As a result, Russia, even if recognised as a colonizer, has not been 
considered a standard-setter and remains disregarded in the renewed debate about the standard 
of civilisation. An enquiry into practices aimed at hierarchisation of international politics 
exercised by non-Western states tends to be animated exclusively by geopolitical 
considerations. The literature presents Russia’s engagement with its peripheries as driven by 
the goal of expanding its territory (in the tsarist period) or its ‘sphere of interest’ (with regard 
to contemporary Russia) and arranged with the use of crude force. Other possible forms of 
exercising power, for instance through the establishment of social order or the promotion of 
certain norms, tend to be overlooked.
34
 
Russia’s production and reproduction of hierarchical arrangements vis-à-vis weaker 
neighbours bears much resemblance to its Western counterparts. The emulation argument is 
widespread in literature analysing colonial practices, as illustrated by the following quotation: 
‘sometimes Imperial ruling elites and subject peoples will be actively borrowing ideas from 
each other, as the Russians did repeatedly from the British in particular’.35 However, the 
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immigration of ideas is never a straightforward process. As it was aptly pointed out by 
Bourdieu:  
‘it rarely happens without these ideas incurring some damage in the process, this is 
because such immigration separates cultural productions from the system of theoretical 
reference points in relation to which they are defined, from their field of production’36.  
It should therefore not come as a surprise that Russia’s understanding and the practices of 
the standard of civilisation are not an exact replica of the Western model. But the West 
remained the major reference point for the Russian elites in the course of the last three 
centuries. As a result, Western ideas and comparisons with the West shaped the content of 
Russia’s policies to a large extent. It is useful to reiterate Isaiah Berlin’s persuasive argument 
that: ‘Russia borrowed ideas from the West and then took them very seriously, and in taking 
them very seriously altered them’.37 In the case of the standard of civilisation Russia copied 
specific Western practice but used them for a different overarching purpose. 
 
Russia and the nineteenth-century standard of civilisation 
There is no simple way of classifying Russia and its policy towards the conquered 
territories in the East. As with any other colonial venture in the nineteenth century, the tsarist 
empire’s policy was driven by a variety of motivations, aims, collective and individual 
ambitions. Russia’s approach was similar to that of other colonisers in that it was subject to 
change and often proved inconsistent.
38
 What links different facets of Russia’s colonial 
enterprise is the willingness to reaffirm its position as an imperial centre and to reinforce the 
hierarchisation of its relations with political entities considered subordinate. 
In order to embark on a discussion of the relationship between Russia and the standard of 
civilisation, it is necessary to provide a short background of how Russia was viewed and how 
it perceived itself as an empire. One specific characteristic of this debate, regardless of the 
particular historical period, is its thorough reliance on comparison. In 1865 James Long, 
humanist and educator, advocated that: ‘Englishmen ought to study Russian progress in Asia; 
not in the mere military aspect, but in its effect in opening out roads for trade in the desert, 
bringing European light and civilisation, suppressing slavery and Mussulmen intolerance’.39 
Twenty years later, as though attentive to this initial call, a more prominent figure in British 
state affairs – Lord Curzon – embarked on a journey the aim of which he described in the 
following words:  
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to compare [Russia’s] genius for assimilation with that of other conquering races. Is 
the apparent security of her sway the artificial product of a tight military grip, or is it 
the natural outcome of peaceful organic fusion? How do her methods and their results 
compare with those of England in India?
40
 
However, Lord Curzon’s opinion upon completion of the journey was highly 
unfavourable for Russia. While Curzon admitted that Russia had begun to recognise her 
‘duties towards those with whose rule she is charged’,41 he rejected the idea that Russia could 
be the promoter of civilisation in Central Asia.
42
 
‘The conquest of Central Asia is a conquest of Orientals by Orientals, of cognate 
character by cognate character. […] This is no nineteenth- century crusade of manners 
or morals; but barbarian Asia, after a sojourn in civilised Europe, returns upon its 
former footsteps to reclaim its own kith and kin’43 
To what extent Russia and its colonial practices could be considered as pertaining to or 
representing those of the West has always been linked to the fundamental question – is Russia 
part of European ‘civilisation’? Russia’s civilizational relationship with the West has been 
mired in contradictions. A uniform position is difficult to find either among Western or 
Russian scholars. What Schimmelpenninck van der Oye termed confusion among Russians 
about their continental identity,
44
 many Russian authors present in civilizational terms.
45
 
Another layer of perplexity was added by the fact that Russians considered themselves to be 
European but many would simultaneously subscribe to the view that Russia is in competition 
with Europe and the West. Russia has been depicted as part of Europe, but one which 
emerged outside the framework of the social, political and cultural life of the West.
46
  
Encounters with the East during the imperial expansion and developments in Russian 
Oriental studies contributed significantly to changes in Russia’s view of itself as 
unquestionably European. Scholars started recognising that Russia’s more frequent 
encounters with Asia contributed to its identity building. St. Petersburg orientalists imagined 
Russia as a political and cultural space with ‘no boundary between the East and the West’.47 
The ideology of Pan-Slavism which presented Russia as a distinct civilisation was inspired by 
Russia’s growing engagement with Asian peoples and polities. Pan-Slavism not only 
underscored cultural differences between Russia and Europe, but went as far as denouncing 
the West for having been weakened by democratisation. The movement emphasised the need 
to restore integrity between territory, the Russian people and orthodoxy.
48
 The pan-Eurasian 
current, postulating that Russia’s Eurasianist identity should be a mixture of national and pan-
 9 
Eurasian elements, was heavily influenced by Russia’s Asian colonial enterprise.49Ultimately, 
political and cultural engagement with the East was to become means of national self-
assertion against Western domination. 
 
(i) The tsarist conquest of Asia and the standard of civilisation 
Based on a feeling of superiority, the separation of us, the civilised from them, the 
barbarous or primitive, is a precondition for hierarchisation and the employment of the 
standard of civilisation. These preconditions were put in place in the Petrine epoch (extending 
from 1697 to 1725), when the Russian elite started to perceive Asia as backward and 
inefficient. This development has usually been considered by comparing Russia to Europe, for 
instance: ‘The educated classes of Petrine Russia shared fully the general European ideology 
in regard to Asia of superiority and even imperial domination’.50 It has been said that Russia 
adopted a ‘Eurocentric feeling of superiority towards Asia’ from the West.51 The consequence 
was that practices of ‘nomadic life’ and terms such as the Orient acquired negative 
connotations. It became common also in public discourse to juxtapose images of the ‘dynamic 
West’ to the ‘stagnant East’.52 
Claims to geographic and ethnographic knowledge allowed Russian colonial empire to 
embark on the enterprise of creating categories and hierarchies. The explorers of the East, 
often from the military ranks, such as Nikolai Przhevalsky, were supplying the elementary 
cognitive ‘material’ on the basis of which native peoples were rated and, subsequently, seen 
to require ‘civilizational’ improvements. Not only the military men but also scholars took part 
in the “discovery” of the East. They were motivated by the assumption that knowledge 
enabled successful administration. Vasilii Grigorev, a well-known Russian orientalist, 
regarded science as serving ‘the greater good of the nation’. For him Orientalism had a 
function greater than just allowing us to get to know and administer the “natives”, it offered 
insight into Russia’s own identity.53 
Russia was constructing its ‘other’ on the basis of several dividing lines. The most 
prevalent us-them distinction was created on the basis of religion and the place of birth. While 
inorodets and inoverets (of different kin and of different faith) were relatively neutral terms, 
Russian officials charged with implementing state policies in the East used a variety of 
derogative notions to refer to the native populations. These depictions pointed to their 
supposed unreliability, ungovernability and the lack of respect for peace. The last feature was 
described by the term nemirnye liudi.
54
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The relationship to land was among the most important dividing markers. The distinction 
between siadiachiye and kochevye (settled and nomadic), further specified according to the 
type of subsistence activity, e.g. pasturing or agriculture, played an especially prominent 
role.
55
 Further divisions were created along dietary habits and sexual behaviour or, more 
broadly, ‘lifestyle’, which could supersede religion as a significant ‘line of cleavage’.56 
 From the point of view of the legal codification of the standard of civilisation it was 
significant that the categories of inorodets and inoverets entered the legal doctrine. The 
Legislative Commission of 1767 confirmed the distinction sedentary-nomadic by the fact that 
it admitted only sedentary Muslims and animists into its ranks, excluding nomadic peoples 
and thereby reducing them to the status of second-class citizens. The commission, in 1798, 
discussed a statute for non-sedentary Russian subjects, which it termed inorodtsy. Its 
objective was to eventually turn nomads into ‘proper’ citizens.57 These processes provided the 
backdrop against which further hierarchisation, this time with implications for international 
politics, could be taking place.  
Having created the other it was appropriate to adopt the right attitude towards those 
deemed less civilised. The Russian elite began to think of itself as the bearer of European 
values in Asia in the eighteenth century, but it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that 
the idea of Russia’s civilising mission in the East crystallised. According to Vasilii Grigorev, 
in 1840, Russia’s aim in Asia was to: ‘set their lives in order and enlighten them’.58 This goal 
was accompanied by appropriate narrative, stipulating that Russia was playing an important 
role in the ‘awakening’ of the Central Asian peoples: ‘Local people were in a deep sleep and 
in this dream unconsciously led their lives as prescribed by their ancestors and religions (…) 
without external influence, Central Asia would never have awaken (…) and now the roads are 
safe, a merchant can lead its caravan peacefully and can rest assured that he will not be 
robbed’.59 The idealised vision of Russia’s civilising mission is best reflected in the writing 
about the first general-governor of Turkestan (Turkestanskii krai), Konstantin von Kaufman. 
He is said to have secured good land for Russian settlers without taking it away from the 
locals; promoted geographic and ethnographic research of the conquered territories in 
agreement with his conviction that one needs to get to know the land to administer it well. He 
is remembered as the one who opened the first public library, established the first newspaper 
and started a number of educational institutions. He is praised for having respected local 
customs and tolerated the use of local justice systems.
60
 
 11 
Comparisons played an important role also in the process of elaborating the elements of 
the civilising mission. Mikhail Pogodin, a Russian orientalist, saw Russia’s civilising mission 
in Asia as identical to those undertaken by Britain, France and other European states and 
stressed that the goal was to bring enlightenment. Government should not be motivated by 
economic gains but by the interests of the natives. To Riasanovsky, Pogodin’s ideas of 
mission civilisatrice were typical of his European counterparts
61
 but advocacy for the interests 
of those subjugated to be taken into account was not that common in Britain or France. 
Grigorev’s opinion regarding the civilising mission evolved as a result of his two decades of 
scholarly and practical engagement with colonial administration. Having, in 1862, resigned 
from the post of Orenburg’s governor due to his disenchantment with the tsarist 
administration’s indifference to scholarly advice, Grigoriev advocated against copying the 
Western civilising mission and its inherent lack of respect for the ‘savages’. He called for a 
uniquely Russian way of approaching the subjugated lands, which he saw as premised on the 
study of local culture and tradition as well as giving voice to Asians. This, however, did not 
preclude him from favouring a deeply paternalistic approach to indigenous peoples who – as 
he claimed – understood only ‘the language of power’.62 
In the 1870s Mikhail Veniukov went even further in his interpretation of what he saw as 
Russia’s goal in Asia. To him the ‘civilising mission’ meant first and foremost respecting 
religious differences and acting in the interest of the well-being of those peoples.
63
 The call to 
respect religions other than Christianity has been voiced since Catherine the Great. Religious 
tolerance has been, however, at times tactically motivated, for instance when lessons drawn 
from the conquest of the Caucasus were to improve tactics for the subordination of the 
Muslim peoples of Central Asia. The enlightened current promoting tolerance coexisted with 
the need to spread Christianity, an important aspect of the civilising mission. Faith was 
commonly understood as intertwined with economic status and social practices. The 
promotion of Christianity, therefore, was inseparable from and needed to go hand in hand 
with improvements to local customs, family relationships, diet and cleanliness.
64
 This aspect 
of Russian policy in the East was interpreted as behaviour modelled on the West: ‘In imitation 
of the Western model, there was an attempt to Christianise the animists and Muslims, using 
force if necessary’.65The abolition of slavery and the slave trade was another important part of 
the civilising mission. Russia eliminated these practices in Turkestan, which by 1867 formed 
part of the Russian Empire, and in the khanates of Bukhara and Khiva (entities politically 
subordinated to Russia since 1873 but formally independent until 1920).
66
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Against this backdrop Russia’s practices of the standard of civilisation were mediated by 
the principle of sliyaniye (Russification), aiming to make colonies part of the Russian state.
67
 
These policies included the appropriation of land, the introduction of administrative structures 
and the settlement of colonisers. As a result, Central Asia was perceived as an issue of 
domestic rather than international politics. The ultimate goal was to bring the peripheries 
closer to the centre, to align and adjust the other and to make them in our own image, and 
even more so, to make them us.
68
 Fulfilling the standard of civilisation was, in case of the 
conquered political entities, to become fully integrated into the empire and, in the case of 
individuals, to become Russian, subjects of tsarist rule – a privilege, a step higher on the 
ladder of civilizational development, and a requirement. The means of transition from a 
‘stateless’ and ‘underdeveloped’ political form into a state structure was only by means of 
incorporation into the empire.  
Russia’s policies were caught between empire- and nation-building, with simultaneous 
Russification and support for ethno-nationalism.
69
 In order to acquire subjectivity, the 
conquered lands and peoples needed to become part of the Russian state. The process of 
passage to citizenship was intended to turn ‘rebellious natives into loyal citizens’.70  The 
principle of sliyaniye, however, stood in some contradiction to the creation of the “barbarous 
other”. This brought challenges at the implementation stage. For instance Alexander II 
judicial reform was deliberately not introduced in the Caucasus and Central Asia due to “the 
savagery and backwardness” of these regions.71 
In addition to contradictions brought forth by the principle of sliyaniye, not on rare 
occasions did the requirements of a civilising mission exceed the capabilities of Russian state 
administration. This led to a paradox. The Russian colonial enterprise was implemented not 
only by Russians but also by individuals from states Russia subjugated in the West, such as 
Poland. For a number of them participation in the colonizing mission was a form of 
punishment for engagement in liberation activities in their own homelands. Others used it as a 
form of career advancement. Jan Witkiewicz was one of the exiles from the colonized western 
part of the Russian empire. Assigned to the military service as the lowest rank border guard, 
he was quickly promoted and ultimately became the tsar’s first emissary to Afghanistan.72 
Bronisław Grąbczewski, educated to join higher ranks of Russia’s military, worked in the 
administration of the newly conquered areas in Central Asia. His extensive travels provided 
the empire with geographic and ethnographic details concerning Russian-Chinese borderlands 
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and made Grąbczewski one of the most respected members of the Russian Geographical 
Society.
73
 
The civilising mission was a complex undertaking. Even though not all its parts have 
been the result of thorough planning, the outcome was an approach comprising military-
political moves intertwined with scholarly and artistic ventures. Art was employed to support 
and promote the civilising mission. The target audience in this case was not the East, the mere 
subject of Russia’s expansion, but the West, where Russia needed to position itself 
appropriately. It needed to be recognised as a forbearer of European civilisation. One such 
artistic mission civilisatrice show was organised in London. Russia displayed a number of 
Vasily Vereshchagin’s paintings depicting Central Asia. The exhibition’s catalogue stated: 
The Central Asian population’s barbarism is so glaring, its economic and social 
condition so degraded, that the sooner European civilization penetrates into the land, 
whether from one side or the other, the better.
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(ii) Multiple functions of the standard 
The tsarist-era standard of civilisation served several objectives, some of which were 
analogous to those of the Western states, particularly the objective of creating and 
reproducing hierarchy between the centre and subordinated states. However, unlike its 
European counterparts, Russia applied the practices of the standard not only with the goal of 
reordering polities it subjugated, but also aiming to regain its great power status in Europe. 
In its most direct application, the standard was supposed to help organize the conquered 
territories and it was a useful devise to legitimise conquest. The paternalistic approach of 
mission civilisatrice was accompanied by the security argument underlining the need to 
promote legal order and secure frontiers. The following quotation serves as an example: 
The Kiptchaks, Bashkirs, Calmucks and Kirgiz, all in their turn were conquered 
by the steadily progressive power of the Russian nation which had not only 
liberated Russia herself, but also freed Europe from the terrors of the incursions 
of the barbaric hordes. The history of our eastward movement is generally 
marked by the same characteristics. Proximity with savage tribes who 
recognized no international or other laws, except only the law of might, has 
compelled us to erect along our frontier a line of forts (…) Thus it has happened 
that the advance of Russia in the east has been a hopeless search after a secure 
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frontier, and such a position she will never find until her territories are 
coterminous with those of a nation which respects treaties, which is sufficiently 
civilised not to live on plunder and pillage.
75
 
At the same time, however, the goal was to secure Russia’s status in Europe, as an equal 
among other European states. It was to legitimise Russia as a ‘civilised’ state and secure its 
status of a great power. To be a great power, Russia needed to prove it acts like one. Hence its 
legitimization tactics were comparison-based. For instance, Alexander Gorchakov, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs to Tsar Alexander II, argued that it had been common for powerful and 
‘more civilised’ states to dominate those less endowed with these qualities: 
Like the United States in America, France in Africa, Holland in her colonies, 
and England in East India (…) it always happens that the more civilised State is 
forced, in the interests of the security of its frontier and its commercial relations, 
to exercise a certain ascendancy over most undesirable neighbours.
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This function of the standard of civilisation reveals the protracted inferiority complex 
Russia developed with regard to the West. In Asia, however, Russia could consider itself to be 
Europe’s equal. Domination over large swaths of Asia was a way to gain Europe’s 
recognition.
77
 Russia employed practices used by the Western states to secure their position 
vis-à-vis non-Western world with different purpose in mind. Not only did it reproduce its pre-
eminence over conquered and subjugated territories, but it also aimed at reordering the top of 
international politics, making itself into an equal among leading European states and claiming 
recognition as a great power. Russia’s employment of the standard of civilisation practices 
turned out to be a far cry from their origins. The East became the source of the very much 
needed self-confidence: ‘if Russia looked to the West from a position of relative weakness, it 
could still face the East with confidence and strength’.78 In Asia Russia’s self-depiction could 
be one of order, civilisation and universality.
79
 For some, especially those representing the 
military, gaining Europe’s recognition could be achieved simply by means of conquest for the 
sake of conquest. But the elite more broadly seemed to have reached a consensus – the 
civilising mission was an important part of Russia’s relation to both – Asia and Europe. 
 
Contemporary Russia and the new standard of civilisation 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the Russian Federation faced a double challenge in its 
international relations. First, it had to forge anew its ties with the West. Secondly, it had to 
specify the attitude towards and devise policies with regard to its neighbourhood, the former 
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Soviet republics. Initially, Russia decided to seek close integration with the West and 
discounted ties with the newly emerged states, perceiving them as an obstacle in its dealings 
with Europe. This was a short-lived policy and towards the mid-1990s Russia, becoming 
gradually disappointed with the West, recovered the interest in the post-Soviet space.
80
 
As in the 19
th
 century, Russia became trapped between self-identification as part of the 
West and portraying itself as a distinct polity. It took Moscow another decade, filled with 
twists and turns in relations with the U.S. and the EU, to redefine the basic contours of its 
foreign policy. Reinvigorated by its own material resurgence, Russia sought to play a more 
significant role on the international stage and by the mid-2000s rejected the idea of ‘joining’ 
or ‘following’ the West. Offers of joining started to be read as disrespectful, denying Russia 
the position of an architect of the global system and relegating it to the secondary function of 
a follower or executor of Europe’s wishes on the international scene. Moscow aimed at 
limiting what it saw as Western imposition and attempts at undermining or navigating 
Russia’s sovereign decisions. Seeing itself as a ‘norm-enforcer’, Russia aspired to position 
itself as the defender of the post-WWII international order, based on the principles of 
sovereignty, UN primacy and respect for international law.
81
 This process was accompanied 
by the development of a specific political system in Russia, one which diverged more and 
more starkly from the Western ideal of liberal democracy and good governance.
82
  
Seemingly, these developments meant Russia’s rejection of Western approaches to 
international politics, including practices recognised by the literature as the new standard of 
civilisation. Such a conclusion, however, overlooks differences with regard to norms Russia 
cherishes and policies it has been implementing in the global and regional realms. In the mid-
2000s, despite the growing alienation from the West, Russia began pursuing policies towards 
the post-Soviet space which closely resembled practices of the new standard of civilisation. 
Moreover, Russia emulated selected Western practices in ways which altered their original 
purpose and made them increasingly identifiable with the 19
th
-century version of the standard 
of civilisation. 
 
(i) The new standard of civilisation in the post-Soviet space 
While for the West it has been the notion of state ‘failure’, ‘underdevelopment’ or 
‘fragility’ which paved the way for the new standard of civilisation, Russia undermined its 
new neighbours’ sovereignty in more explicit ways. The process of discursive subordination 
of the newly independent states to the Russian ‘centre’ started long before the more 
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sophisticated approaches that Moscow developed in the 2000s and set the stage for the re-
hierarchisation of the post-Soviet area. Shortly after the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia, 
determined to legitimise internationally its zone of special interests in the post-Soviet region, 
embarked upon securing what it saw as its unalienable rights in the region. In 1992 Evgenii 
Ambartsumov, the Supreme Soviet chair, declared that as the legal successor to the USSR, 
Russia had the right to a sphere of its vital interests and it ‘must seek the world community’s 
understanding and recognition of its interests in this space’.83 The newly independent states 
were considered of lesser international standing than the successor to the Soviet Union. The 
concept of the ‘near abroad’ manifested and symbolised Russia’s challenging the right of the 
post-Soviet states to sovereignty.
84
 This derogative language situated the newly independent 
states in a clearly inferior position, which facilitated the future application of the practices 
interpreted as the new standard of civilisation.  
The ‘near abroad’ rhetoric has been changing. The claim to a privileged position and 
respect for special interests merged with the modelled on the West discourse of good 
neighbourly relations. The 2008 statement by the then Russian president Dmitry Medvedev is 
an accurate exposition of this trend:  
‘… there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to 
countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as 
friends and good neighbours, we will pay particular attention to our work in these 
regions and build friendly ties with these countries …’.85  
Despite this new rhetoric’s aspiration for political correctness, references to civilisation 
continue to figure prominently in speech acts, torn between the urge to manifest strength and 
the need to show benign motives. For instance, Russia’s political leadership denoted to the 
Eurasian Union as ‘the most civilised’ way of arranging regional relations.86 Similarly to the 
19
th
-century employment of the language of civilisation, Russia has been making use of 
civilizational vocabulary in order to justify and legitimise its regional policies. 
The key Russian programmatic documents, the 2013 Foreign Policy Concept and the 
2015 National Security Strategy demonstrate a contradictory approach towards post-Soviet 
states: . On the one hand, the foreign policy document stresses historical ties, common 
cultural and civilizational heritage, implying equality among the post-Soviet states. On the 
other hand, the concept’s rhetoric explicitly justifies Russia’s special rights and 
responsibilities in the region by referring to the fact that ethnic Russians continue to live in 
post-Soviet states.
87
 Russia declares its respect for the choices made by particular states but 
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expects these states to fulfil their ‘obligations’ towards the perceived post-Soviet community, 
by way of supporting the integration process.
88
 The 2015 National Security Strategy discourse 
of openness and friendliness is interwoven with clear statement of Russia’s own goals and the 
need to establish a model solution for post-Soviet states. Points 43 and 44 respectively 
declare:  ‘Russia forges friendly relations with each of the CIS Member States on the basis of 
equality, mutual benefit, respect for and consideration of each other's interests (…)’ and 
‘Russia sees as a priority the task of establishing the Eurasian Economic Union aiming not 
only to make the best use of mutually beneficial economic ties in the CIS space but also to 
become a model of association open to other states, a model that would determine the future 
of the Commonwealth states.’89 
Following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the language of special historical ties 
with post-Soviet states was regularly invoked in order to justify Russia’s policy towards 
Ukraine. Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, paying lip service to post-Soviet state’s right to 
make their own choices in foreign policy, supplemented the historical-civilizational narrative 
of unity with references to strong economic ties. He stressed that Ukraine had been deeply 
embedded in the economics of the Commonwealth of Independent States and, along with 
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, was part of the biggest economic complex in the world, built 
for ‘decades if not centuries’.90 
While Russia reactivated its policy towards the post-Soviet region capitalising on its 
material resurgence of the early-2000s, the emulation of the new standard of civilisation 
practices has been particularly visible in the economic sphere since the mid-2000s. The 
promotion of market economy and trade was to be aided by integration initiatives and 
development assistance. Even though Russia has not itself embraced the full spectrum of neo-
liberal economic recipes and finalised its WTO accession only in 2012, it engaged in the 
setting of economic standards for the post-Soviet space.  
The Eurasian Development Bank, established by Russia and Kazakhstan in 2006, has 
been the precursor of the approach modelled on the global standard of market civilisation. Its 
mission is ‘to facilitate the development of market economies, sustainable economic growth 
and the expansion of mutual trade and other economic ties in its member states’.91  The 
institution uses neoliberal language reiterating the classical features of the Washington 
consensus. The Bank’s goals include the creation of market economies and institutional 
framework needed for such economies to thrive.
92
 It declares its aim to ‘help promote 
 18 
economic growth in the Bank’s member states, encourage sustainable long-term development, 
mutual trade, joint ventures and transboundary holdings’.93 
The Eurasian Bank turned out to be just a hallmark of things to come. In 2009, Russia 
initiated the most comprehensive attempt at reorganisation of the post-Soviet regional order 
by means of economic integration. Moscow started by putting forward the idea of the 
Customs Union which could link Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The new organisation 
gained shape in 2010 with the introduction of a single tariff and a common custom code, both 
typical for integration patterns of the EU.
94
 In 2012, the Customs Union evolved into the 
Common Economic Space. Two years later, in 2014, three member states signed a treaty 
establishing, as of January 2015, the Eurasian Economic Union. The 2015 saw Armenia and 
Kyrgyzstan joining the Union. 
Russia claims the Eurasian Economic Union to be the most concerted integration and 
economic cooperation project. Despite the fact that many analysts point to the EEU’s anti-EU 
character,
95
 it is important to notice that the project is explicitly modelled on the European 
Union and its version of market economy. Requirements related to the market economy 
constitute a large part of this most recent push for integration in the post-Soviet sphere. The 
overarching stated goal is the creation of a single market among the participating states and 
the introduction of the four freedoms of movement, encompassing: goods, services, capital 
and labour. Integration within the EEU involves such areas as: macroeconomic policy, the 
operation and access to services provided by selected natural monopolies, competition policy, 
government subsidies for industry and agriculture, public procurement at local level, and the 
rules of intellectual property protection.
96
 
Not only the objectives but also the EEU’s institutional arrangements resemble the 
architecture of the EU. Integration is administered by a supra-national body, the College of 
the Eurasian Economic Commission, corresponding to the European Commission. College 
members are selected by member states to oversee 23 departments, responsible for particular 
economic sectors and issues. The College is supervised by the Council of the Eurasian 
Economic Commission. Both are subordinate to the High Eurasian Economic Council, which 
operates at the level of prime ministers or presidents.
97
 
While the European states in their international arrangements make effort to minimise 
differences in political and economic power, in the case of Russian-led integration the goal 
has been different. For Moscow, post-Soviet integration in the form of the EEU is to secure 
Russia’s leadership and reinforce the existing hierarchical arrangements.98 Integration is also 
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expected to foreclose the post-Soviet space from the European Union’s influence. Russia 
emulated certain Western practices, changing their purpose in the process. In the post-Soviet 
space, integration became a tool for reproducing hierarchy rather than means for safeguarding 
equality, which makes its practices analogous to those of the new standard of civilisation.  
Liberal interventionism – a term expressing criticism of humanitarian intervention and 
development aid – has also been incorporated under the new standard of civilisation idea. 
While Russia vehemently opposes Western liberal interventions, it does employ humanitarian 
and development aid as tools in its policies towards post-Soviet states. The donor role, 
similarly to the role of the centre of integration initiatives, is to Russia a matter of status. It 
establishes a state’s position on the international arena.99 Back in 2004, Russia still figured on 
the OECD list of aid recipients.
100
 Russia’s renunciation of the aid recipient role is part and 
parcel of Russia’s strategy for achieving and maintaining self-esteem as well as making other 
actors recognize and acknowledge it. Rather than the improvement of specific conditions in 
the receiving state, the goal of Russia’s development co-operation is to ‘look seriously’ in the 
international arena and to be perceived as a ‘civilized’ donor.101  
In 2007, Russia adopted a policy strategy on development assistance – The Concept of 
Russia’s participation in development co-operation.102 Since then it has been building up its 
aid implementation agency – Rossotrudnichestvo – establishing and developing its branches 
in former Soviet republics. Russia’s determination to be acknowledged as aid provider is best 
illustrated with Dmitri Medvedev emphasising the need for Russia’s aid to be recognised as 
such: ‘These states which obtain funds from us, should know better, where does the assistance 
come from’.103.  
The aspiration to play a donor role did not stand in the way of more crude practices. 
Russia constructed the need to defend the rights and welfare of Russian citizens and used it to 
legitimise intervention. Humanitarian arguments and the need to defend Russian compatriots 
were used to justify the use of military force in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014. On 
the one hand, Russia attempted to follow the Western practice of humanitarian intervention, 
on the other hand, it returned to the classical understanding of the standard of civilisation, in 
terms of defence of one’s nationals in the ‘peripheries’. Since the mid-2000s, Moscow 
granted Russian passports to the citizens of two Georgian break-away provinces, Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. This policy allowed Russia for invoking the obligation to defend ‘its’ 
citizens and use it to justify the use of military force in response to Georgia’s attempt to bring 
back control over South Ossetia in 2008.
104
 Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the ‘silent 
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intervention’ in Ukraine in 2014 did not rely on the argument of defending Russia’s nationals 
but were mired in the rhetoric of the need to protect ethnic Russians. Failing to produce any 
substantial evidence, Moscow continually argued that extreme nationalism of the post-Maidan 
Ukrainian government posed a threat to Russian minority.
105
 These legitimization practices, 
employed in Georgia and Ukraine, are dangerously close to imperial practices of enforcing 
the standard of civilisation. Intervention to ‘save’ Russian nationals or ethnic Russians served 
as a relatively persuasive justification for a course of action that would otherwise risk 
contradicting Russia’s own concern with territorial integrity and the supposedly cherished 
respect for sovereignty.
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(ii) Dual functions of the new standard 
At the beginning of the 21
st
-century Russia amply drew upon Western practices 
interpreted as the new standard of civilisation in developing its policies in the post-Soviet 
space. Simultaneously, it gave new meaning and new purpose to practices such as economic 
integration, turning them into instruments of hierarchy building. Despite the fact that Moscow 
has been vocal in condemning the West for applying neo-colonial practices in the developing 
world, in particular the principle of aid conditionality applied by the EU, its own practices of 
the new standard of civilisation perpetuated inequality between Russia and independent states 
in the post-Soviet area. 
Russia’s goals, however, have been broader than the reproduction of hierarchy within the 
borders of the former Soviet Union. Russia’s policies have been those of a status seeker, 
willing to enhance its clout globally. The application of analogous to Western practices was to 
help achieve this goal and satisfy the continuous Russia’s yearning for recognition as the 
West’s equal. At the turn of the century, Russia has once again attempted to compensate for 
its internal deficiencies with the emulation of specific practices towards its neighbourhood. 
As in the 19
th
 century, Russia chose to validate what is saw as its great power credentials 
establishing and enhancing its relative primacy as an imagined centre among post-Soviet 
peripheries. The road to a greater standing in the global realm required, so has been the logic 
of Russian political leadership, a re-establishing of a dominant regional position in the post-
Soviet space.  
The Eurasian Economic Union in particular has been seen by Russia as an entity 
enhancing Moscow’s status of an equal vis-à-vis the West.107 Though Russia has fiercely 
contested Western criteria of good governance and has strongly opposed ‘extreme, Western-
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style liberalism’, 108  it has nevertheless implemented a version of regional integration 
explicitly modelled on the European Union. Moscow presented the Eurasian Economic Union 
as the exemplification of modern economic integration that is based on ‘universal integration 
standards’.109 As such, the Eurasian Economic Union is, among other goals, oriented at the 
demonstration that Russia is capable of implementing the same practices as the West. 
Moreover, Moscow made it clear that it expected the European Union to recognise Russia’s 
equal status by opening an official dialogue with the Eurasian Economic Union. By entering 
into such a dialogue, the EU would recognise Russia’s integration project as an equal 
structure. Russia’s ultimate goal has been to gain acceptance of its concept of a ‘Wider 
Europe’. According to this vision widely shared by the Russian elite, Russian-led Eurasian 
Economic Union and the European Union should function as two equal components of a pan-
European order.
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 According to the Russian elite, economic cooperation should be the initial 
component of the ‘Wider Europe’. To that end Russia proposed to establish a free trade zone 
between the EEU and EU.
111
 The concept of Wider Europe goes beyond the economic realm. 
It should lead to stronger political and security ties. The need for such cooperation is justified 
with reference to the interests of all Europeans: ‘We continue to believe that the best way to 
ensure the interests of the peoples living in Europe is to form a common economic and 
humanitarian space from the Atlantic to the Pacific, so that the newly formed Eurasian 
Economic Union could be an integrating link between Europe and Asia Pacific’. 112 
Cooperation between EEU and EU, forged not solely on the West’s terms, would be the 
ultimate confirmation of Russia’s equal standing with respect to Western Europe. 
 
Conclusions 
Recent literature advocated taking closer look at current imperial civilising missions and 
how they help empires define their own role in the world.
113
 This article engaged with one 
aspect of imperial politics - the standard of civilisation. I proposed broadening the debate 
about the standard beyond the well-described divisions between the West and colonies, or 
between the West and the South. Russia, with its history of colonial conquest, contemporary 
pretences to regional predominance and a complex relationship with the West, cuts across 
these traditional research paths. Russia’s lagging behind in terms of internal governance has 
long been used as an argument for denying Moscow a place in European politics. Russia 
attempted to compensate for these deficiencies with intensified activity in its ‘peripheries’. I 
argued that one way for Russia to deal with its lack of the ‘European security of self’114 had 
been to employ the standard of civilisation in its ‘peripheries’. The standard of civilisation has 
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been used to position Russia as the representative of European civilisation towards the 
‘primitive’ East and, more importantly, to make Russia equal among equals in Europe. As a 
result the standard of civilisation plays a twofold role for Russia. On the one hand, it is a way 
for a hierarchical structuring of regional politics and the re-arrangement of the ‘peripheries’ 
according to Russia’s wishes. On the other hand, it is used to secure the imagined status of a 
power equal to the West.  
The practices of the standard of civilisation have been essential in Russia’s relations with 
other great powers. They have served as means of upgrading Russia’s perceived status and as 
a way to legitimise the right of belonging to the ‘club’. Unable to fulfil criteria of belonging to 
the Western family of states based on domestic arrangements, such as strong state institutions 
or democratic governance, Russia reached out for means of external validation of its great 
power credentials. The reordering of its peripheries, accompanied with the language of a 
civilising mission, has been an important component of the upgrading of its status on the 
international scene.  
This discussion confirms the importance of Western ideas for Russia. The West continues 
to be the main reference point for Russian policies and an important aspect of Russia’s 
construction of its own identity. Russia’s engagement with Western ideas is far from 
straightforward. It does not stop at imitation. Emulating the standard of civilisation, Russia 
significantly modified it, adjusting it to specific circumstances. Bewildered by admiration, 
fear and contempt for Western structures and values, Russia copied but also modified selected 
elements of the standard of civilisation, adjusting it to its own needs. Making use of certain 
Western ideas does not mean Russia has subscribed to their normative underpinnings. 
The case of Russia leads us to a broader conclusion regarding the standard of civilisation. 
Both for Gerritt Gong who introduced this concept in the IR literature, and for his critics, the 
standard of civilisation served to explain the hierarchical structure of international politics and 
the creation and durability of barriers between the centre and the peripheries. What emerges 
as a result of this analysis is a more complex picture of the standard’s functions. The 
articulation of certain requirements continues to set the benchmark for inclusion and 
exclusion. For the West, the standard of civilisation has been a way of legitimising its pre-
eminence and maintaining its advantage as a centre of international politics. But, the idea of 
the standard of civilisation, apart from facilitating the arrangement of international politics 
along the ‘centre-periphery’ lines, has been influencing relations between states in the 
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position of power. Rather than creating distinctions, the standard of civilisation has been used 
to show a state’s equal position and regarded as an entry ticket to the club of powerful states. 
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